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Debunking 10 ‘pseudo facts’ about the crisis
By Steve Coulter, LSE
Thomas  Piketty  is  not  the  only  French  economist  opposing  the  prevailing  economic  orthodoxy.
One group of France­based academics, ‘les économistes atterrés’ (economists against austerity)
has  been  denouncing  austerity  policies,  inequality  and  the  financialisation  of  the  European
economy  since  its  formation  in  2010.  They  have  mounted  an  appeal  to  voters  in  the  coming
European  elections  (read  it  here)  and  are  organising  lectures  and  debates  on  similar  themes
across  Europe,  including  an  interesting  looking  event  with  Dany  Lang  in  London  to  be  held  at
UCL, Roberts Building (Engineering), G08 Sir David Davies Lecture Theatre, 6.30­8.30pm. 
Details  of  this  can  be  found  on  their  website,  as well  as  the  group’s manifesto, which  lists  ten
‘obvious facts’ about the current crisis that need to be confronted, together with policy proposals.
The Manifesto sold 80,000 copies in France, 20,000 more in both Spain and Greece and more in
other countries. They are worth listing here:
Erroneous ‘Pseudo Facts’
that need to be
confronted:
Measures to deal with the problem: 
1. ‘Financial    markets are
efficient.’
1: To   separate strictly financial markets and the activities of financial
actors,   prohibiting banks from speculating on their own account, in
order to prevent   the spread of bubbles and crashes. 2:   To reduce
liquidity and destabilizing speculation by controls on capital  
movements and taxation on financial transactions. 3: To restrict
financial    transactions to those meeting the needs of the real
economy (e.g., CDS only    to holders of insured securities, etc.). 4:
Capping the earnings of traders. 
2. ‘Financial    markets
contribute to economic
growth.’
5: To strengthen significantly counter-powers within firms, in order to
  force the management to take into account the interests of all the  
stakeholders. 6: To increase significantly the taxation of very high
incomes   to discourage the race towards unsustainable returns. 7: To
reduce the    dependency of firms vis-à-vis financial markets, and to
develop a public    policy of credit (preferential rates for priority
activities on the social and   environmental levels). 
3. ‘Markets assess  
correctly the solvency of
states.’
8: Rating agencies should not    be allowed to influence arbitrarily
interest rates on bond markets by   downgrading the rating of a State.
The activities of agencies should be   regulated in a way that requires
that their ratings result from a transparent   economic calculation. 8a:
States should be freed from the threat of financial    markets by
guaranteeing the purchase of public securities by the European  
Central Bank (ECB).
4. ‘The soar (sic)   in public
debt results from
excessive spending.’
9 : To conduct a public audit   of public debts, in order to determine
their origin and to identify the main    holders of debt securities, as
well as the amounts held.
5. ‘Public    spending must
be cut in order to reduce
public debt.’
10: The level of social    protections (unemployment benefits,
housing…) must be maintained, or even    improved. 11: Public
spending on education, research, investment in    environmental
conversion, etc., must be increased, in order to set up the   conditions
for sustainable growth and to bring about a sharp fall in  
unemployment.
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6. ‘Public    debt shifts the
burden of our excesses
onto our grandchildren.’
12 : To restore the strongly   redistributive nature of direct taxation on
income (suppressing tax breaks,   creating new steps, and increasing
the rates of income tax…) 13 : To   suppress tax exemptions granted
to companies, which have insufficient effects   on employment.
7. ‘We must    reassure
financial markets in order
to keep funding public
debt.’
14 : To authorize the    European Central Bank to directly fund
European states at low interest rates,   thus loosening the straitjacket
of financial markets (or to require   commercial banks to subscribe to
the issue of government bonds). 15 : If   necessary, to restructure the
public debt, for example by capping the service    of public debt to a
certain percentage of GDP, and by discriminating between   creditors
according to the volume of shares they hold. In fact, very large  
stockholders (individuals or institutions) must accept a substantial  
lengthening of the debt profile, and even partial or total cancellation.
We    must also renegotiate the exorbitant interest rates paid on
bonds issued by   countries in trouble since the crisis.
8. ‘The EU    protects the
European Social Model.’
16: To call into question the    free movement of capital and goods
between the EU and the rest of the world,   by negotiating bilateral or
multilateral agreements if necessary. 17: To make   “harmonization in
progress” the guiding principle of European construction,   instead of
competition policy. To establish binding common goals in the   social
and macro-economic areas (with the creation of Broad Social Policy  
Guidelines, or BSPGs).
9. ‘The Euro    is a ‘shield’
against the crisis.’
18: To ensure effective   coordination of macroeconomic policies and
a concerted reduction of trade    imbalances between European
countries. 19: To offset payments imbalances in   Europe by a Bank of
Settlements (that would organize loans between European  
countries). 20 : If the Euro crisis leads to the end of the Euro, and
pending    the reviving of the EU budget (see below), to establish an
intra-European   monetary system (with a common currency such as
the “Bancor”) which would   organize the unwinding of imbalances in
trade balances in Europe.
10. ‘The Greek   crisis was
a springboard towards an
economic government of
Europe and    effective
economic solidarity.’
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